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IN THE SUPREME COURT
Q~F THE STATE 0'F UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.ROBERT HENRY MARTINEZ,
HENRY ALVERIZ, and
JOSEPH BERT MATTEO,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case
No. 8796

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At trial held on April14, 1957, in the District Court
of Weber County, appellants were convicted of the crime
of rape and sentenced to the Utah State Prison.
The evidence revealed that on the night of April 9th
and the early morning of April 10, 1957, in Davis and
Weber Counties, a seventeen-year-old girl, the prosecutrix, had sexual intercourse with a number of boys.
The acts occurred in the back seat of an automobile during times when the car was parked and moving. It appears
that two of the appellants here had intercourse with the
prosecutrix, and that the third one, Matteo, attempted,
1
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but did not succeed. Appellants admitted acts of intercourse, and the substantial conflict of evidence concerns
the use of force and threats. Prosecutrix testified that
she was threatened, struck and forced to submit. Appellants deny that any force or threats were used. The jury
chose to believe the prosecutrix. Other specific facts will
be mentioned as they concern a particular issue on appeal.
For the purpose of clarity the points of this brief
correspond to the points of ~L\_ppellants' brief.
S'_LATE:JIEXT OF POIXTS
PoiNT

I.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMIITING INTO
EVIDENCE TESTIMQ~-ry BY THE DEFENDANT
AL VERIZ THAT HE AND THE OTHER DEFENDANTS WERE IN THE STATE SCHOOL TOGETHER.
PoiNT

II.

IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO INVITE JURORS TO ASK QUESTIONS OF WITNESSES, INCLUDING THE DEFENDANTS, NOR
DID THIS CONDUCT RESULT IN PREJUDICIAL
ERROR.
-""'I

PoiNT

III.

IT W...X.S NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT
TO PERMIT THE WITNESS \l"OSS TO TESTIFY
~.X.FTER THE JUR1~ HAD BEGUN ITS DELIBERATIONS, NOR WAS IT PREJUDICIAL.
PoiNT

IV.

THE TRIAL JUDGE'S CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL,
T()t~ETHER WITH STATEMENTS MADE BY HIM,
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WERE NOT IN
PRE.JUDICIAL.

ERROR

AND

WERE

NOT

V.

PoiNT

IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR. THE CO·URT TO ADMIT AS EVIDENCE c·oNVERSATIONS HELD BY
THE PROSECUTRIX AFTER THE AT'TACK, NOR
"'VVAS SUCH EVIDENCE PREJUDICIAL.

VI.

PoiNT

ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE COURT, IF' ANY,
WERE NOT CUMULATIVE, AND WERE NOT
PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS.
PoiNT

VII.

THE E.VIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CO·NVICT THE DEFENDANTS OF THE CRIME O·F·
RAPE.

ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO
EVIDENCE TESTIMONY BY THE DEFENDANT
ALVERIZ THAT HE AND THE OTHE.R DEF'ENDANTS WERE IN THE STATE SCHOOL TOGETHER.

It is to be noted at the outset that the scope of crossexamination is always broad, and that the discretionary
powers of the trial judge in permitting cross-examination are extensive.
As conceded by appellants, it is proper cross-examination to inquire of defendants whether they are acquaint3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ed. It i s generally held that it is proper to show
association. That they had lived together at the State
School for a period of time might have been significant
in this case where the alleged sexual offense was participated in by all defendants and appeared to be a concerted act. Their being together at the State School indicates a closer association than might exist otherwise.
For whatever effect it might have had on the minds
of the jury, it is to be noted that the terms "incarcerated"
and the "State Industrial School" do not appear in the
transcript of record. The only term used in this connection was "The State School."
The admission of the evidence herein objected to was
not prejudicial to defendants. There was already testimony before the jury that defendants had been or were
going to the State School. The prosecutrix and the witness Evans had both testified that the defendant Alveriz
had said to them that he had been at the State School,
and also that ''we are going out to the State School
anyway.'' Counsel at trial made no motion to strike this
evidence.
It is submitted that the evidence that defendants
were in the State School would be admissible for the
purpose of discrediting defendants. It '""as held in People
v. I-I alpin (1916 Ill.) 114 N.E. 933, that the cross-examination of a witness as to his occupation, associations, and
conduct for the purpose of determining his credibility,
is a matter to a great extent in the discretion of the couT't,
4
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and does not constitute error unless the discretion is
abused. See also Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th
Edition, Section 880. In Sweeney v. State (1923 Ark.)
256 S.W. 73, the Supreme Court of Arkansas said:
''The court did not err in permitting counsel
for the state, on cross-examination, to ask the appellant if he were a gambler and whether he had
been in jail. The appellant, in answer to these
questions, stated that he had gambled some, and
that he had been in jail at Walnut Ridge, at Pocahontas, and at Harrisburg. The connection in
\Vhich these questions were asked shows that the
prosecuting attorney was attempting to prove the
recent residence, occupation~ and history of the
accused as affecting his credibility."
In a leading Utah case, this court, in considering·
the problem of admissibility of testimony elicited on
cross-examination, laid down the following rules :
"(1) Any witness may be asked on cross-examination whether he has been convicted of a
felony.
(2) Any witness may be asked a question the
answer to which has a direct tendency to degrade
his or her character if it is pertinent to establish
the ultimate fact in issue or to a fact from which
such fact may be presumed or inferred.
(3) Questions whose only object could be to
call for answers to affect the credibility of the
witness and which answers would tend to degrade
his or her character, but not tend to subject such
witness to punishment for a felony, are permissible over a general objection as to their relevancy
or competency, in the sound discretion of the court.
5
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(4) Questions whose only object could be to
call for an answer to affect the credibility of the
Tvvitness and which would tend to subject such witness to punishment for a felony, are permissible
over a general objection as to their relevancy or
competency, in the sound discretion of the court.''

EJtate v. Hougensen (1936 Utah) 64 P. 2d 229.
PoiNT

II.

IT WAS NOT ERR.O·R FOR THE COURT TO INVITE JURORS TO ASK QUESTIONS OF WITNESSES, INCLUDING THE DE.FENDANTS, NOR
DID THIS CONDUC'T RESULT IN PREJUDICIAL
ERROR.
It is generally held in this country that it is not error
for the court to invite jurors to ask questions of witnesses. See 159 A.L.R. 347, Louisville Bridge and Terminal Company v. Brow11b, (1929 Ky.) 277 S.W. 320, State
v. Bradford (1911 S.C.) 70 S.E. 308, State v. Kendall
(1907 N.C.) 5·7 S.E. 340, and State v. Sickles (1926 ~Io.)
286 S.W. 432. State v. Anderson (1945 Utah) 158 P. 2d
127, is a leading decision by this court discussing this
problem. There the court, during trial, inquired of the
jury whether they would like to ask questions of a mtness.
Two jurors responded by asking questions, and this was
attacked by the defendants as error. On appeal this
court found no error. A portion of the decision is quoted:
''Whether a juror
tions of a "\vitness
trial court. * * *
granted the jurors

''Till be permitted to ask quesis "\Yithin the discretion of the
The fact that the trial court
permission to ask questions of
6
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witnesses vvithout any special request from them
for this privilege does not, in our opinion, in and
of itself constitute error. The determining factors
as to whether error has been committed is the type
of questions asked and allowed to be answered. If
the questions asked are not germane to the issues
involved or are such as would be clearly improper
and therefore prejudicial to the rights of the defendants to a fair and impartial trial, the court's
a1lo"\\ri.ng them to be answered would be error. As
stated in Jones' Commentaries on Evidence, 2nd
Ed. Vol. 5, Page 4539, Sec. 2320:
'The privilege of examining witnesses is extended to jurors and may be exercised by them to
draw out or clear up an uncertain point in the testimony. It has even been said that jurors should
be encouraged to ask questions. They should not,
however, be permitted to take the examination of
witnesses out of the hands of counsel and to question witnesses at length, nor should they be permitted to interrupt the orderly conduct of the
cause with unnecessary questions.'
See also cases cited supra.
*
*
This privilege should only be granted when in the
sound discretion of the court it appears that it
will aid a juror in understanding some material
issue involved in the case and ordinarily when
some juror has indicated that he wishes such a
point clarified.''
The court also analyzed the questions asked by the jurors
and appeared to lay down a criteria for the admission of
such evidence.
''These questions might properly have been
elicited on the direct examination of the witness

7
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and were such as 'vould clarify material points
in the testimony.''
Appellants, in Point II of their brief, specify various
instances in the transcript of trial when the court invited
the jurors to ask questions, and claimed these to be error.
Examination of the transcript does not reveal that the
questions asked by jurors were improper .or prejudicial.
They were not leading, and they met the test suggested
~J~ove in the Anderson case, supra, that they "might
properly have been elicited on the direct examination
of the witness.'' As stated in the Anderson case, the determination of whether or not jurors may ask questions is a problem to be left to the sound discretion of
the trial court. See also Krause v. State, (1942 Okla.)
132 P. 2d 179.
Where jurors have interrogated witnesses, it is the
obligation of the party complaining to show that his
rights have been prejudiced thereby. White '· Little
(1928 Okla.) 268 P. 221. Analysis of the questions and
the answers elicited in this case does not reveal prejudice to the defendants; they pertain to matters germane
to matters which had been brought up previously by counsel for the parties. Defendants have failed to show how
they were prejudiced.
We have not undertaken to quote these questions and
answers which defenda11t objects to~ we believe they can
be examined more readily in the trial transcript. In view
of the standards suggested by the court in the Anderson
case, and after exnmina tion of the questions asked by

8
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jurors here, we submit that they were not improper, nor
were they prejudicial.
PorNT III.

IT WAS NOT ERROR FO·R THE TRIAL COUR.T
TO PERMIT THE WITNESS VOSS TO TESTIFY
AFTER THE JURY HAD BEGUN ITS DELIBERATIONS, NO·R WAS IT; PREJUDICIAL.

After the jury had started its deliberations, it returned to the courtroom and requested that one Bruce
Voss be called as a witness. Voss had not been called by
either the prosecution or the defense; he had been with
the defendants in the car during the time of the alleged
rape and admitted having sexual intercourse with the
prosecutrix.
It has been generally held that whether a case will
be reopened for additional evidence is a question within
the discretion of the trial judge, and his decision will not
be set aside unless it is clearly an abuse of discretion. In
a Utah case, State v. Duncarn. (1942 Ut.) 132 P. 2d 121,
where the right of the trial judge to re-open a case was
in question, it was held that the court had the right to
recall the jury and to re-open the case, to enable the witness to testify. The Supreme Court added:
"The purpose of a trial is to obtain the facts."
In Miller v. Commonwealth (1920 Ky.) 222 S.W. 96, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky made the following
finding:
''Any member of the jury has the right, during the examination of a witness, to ask any com9
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petent, pertinent question, and, after the jury has
retired to consider their verdict, they have the
right to return to the courtroom and ask that a
witness, who has testified, be recalled if he is
present or so convenient as to be quickly secured
and in the presence of the court, the parties to the
case and their attorneys ask the witness any pertinent, competent questions relating to matter
brought out on the examination of the witness.''
In North Carolina the rule seems well settled that it is
discretionary with the trial judge, whether a case will be
re-opened for additional evidence. In Miller v. Greenwood (1940 N.C.) 10 S.E. 2d 708, it was said:
"It is altogether discretionary with the presiding judge whether he will re-open the case and
admit additional testimony after the conclusion
of the evidence and even after argumentof counsel. * * * (Cases omitted.) When the ends of
justice require, this may be done, even after the
jury has retired.* * * (Cases omitted.) ''
It has been held in a South Carolina case that it is
'vithin the sound discretion of a trial court to grant or
refuse an application for the re-opening of a case for the
introduction of additional evidence, even after the commencement of arguments to the jury and later. Darniel v.
Tower Truckvng Comparny (1944) 32 S.E. 2d 5. In a
recent New Jersey case in reviewing the action of a trial
court in refusing to re-open a case and permit the introduction of evidence, the Supreme Court of that state made
this broad ruling:
''After either or both parties have rested, the
admission or exclusion of further evidence is in

10
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the discretion of the judge, and this discretion
extends to evidence offered during and after the
argument, and even after the cause has been submitted to the jury, but an exception may be taken,
and if the ruling be an abuse or discretion, relief
may be had." Carlo v. Okonite Callender Cable
Company (1949) 69 Atl. 2d 734.
Defendants vigorously attack the admissibility of
the testimony of Voss, but they have failed to show wherein any prejudice resulted to them. A review of the \Vitness Voss's testimony reveals that it closely parallels
the testimony of the defendants, and in fact, it appears
that he could well have been a witness for the defense.
He testified that no force was used against the prosecutrix; that he helped her take her clothes off, and left
the implication that he did this because she needed help.
His testimony was to the effect that the prosecutrix had
willingly submitted. Furthermore, Voss's testimony did
not bring up any new matter; it related entirely to evidence previously admitted.
It is submitted that it was not an abuse of the trial
judge's discretion to re-open the case and admit the
testimony of the witness Voss, and further, if such evidence was not admissible, it was not prejudicial under the
circumstances.
PorNT IV.

THE TRIAL JUDGE'S CONDUCT OF THE T·RIAL,
TOGETHER. WITH STAT'EMENTS MADE· BY HIM,
WERE NOT IN ERROR AND WERE N'OT
PREJUDICIAL.

11
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Defendants allege, in Point IV of their brief, that
certain conduct and remarks by the trial judge were
prejudicial to the defendants. For the purpose of this
point, it will be necessary to consider each instance
separately.
On pages 26, 27, and 28 of appellants' brief, objection is made to two statements of the trial judge as they
relate to the defendant Matteo. The court said that
defendants' objection to testimony was "superficial and
technical.'' Defendants attack this, stating that whether
intercourse occurred between prosecutrix and defendant was not ''superficial and technical'' in a criminal
prosecution. It is noted, however, that after the objection was overruled and the prosecutrix was permitted to
testify, she stated that Matteo did not have sexual intercourse with her. Defendants also attack the court's statement, ''The jury understands the situation,'' as amounting to an instruction as to what the court feels the situation is, but the court does not reveal what it thinks
the situation is. Defendants are merely suggesting how
the jury was impressed; there ,,·as no sho"ring that this
was prejudicial.
Defendants next take objection to the following
statement by the Court: ''The theory is obviously joined
her, assisting the others, yon may go for,vard. '~ See page
42 of the transcript and page 28 of defendants' brief.
This statement does not instruct the jury that defendant Matteo aided and abetted the other defendants. The
court's statement is merely an explanation of the legal

12
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ground on which he overruled defendants' objection, his
use of the term ''theory'' is significant in that respect.
Certainly the court may explain his reason for such a
ruling.
On page 29 of their brief, defendants take exception
to certain statements made by the court during the crossexamination of the defendant Martinez as to how much
beer the defendant had drunk. The court did not take
over the cross-examination. The trial judge stated
that he did not hear the witness's answer. Certainly it
is not improper for a trial judge to seek to clear up a
matter which he did not hear, or which he did not understand. The court's statement did not indicate to the jury
that he believed the witness was evasive. Martinez's
answer had not been responsive, and the court sought to
have a direct answer. It appears from the record that the
Court might reasonably have believed that defendant
was evasive. It was not insisted that the witness answer
yes or no to the question, rather he was directed to "answer the question if you can,'' and again ''did you drink
8 or 10 bottles, or did you know~ Or, do you know~''
It may have appeared to the court that counsel was
coaching the witness in this instance, especially since
the court stated that it had not heard the witness's
answer, and since counsel was now attempting to explain it to the court. Such statement, in any event, was
not prejudicial. If it were held to be error every time
counsel in a criminal prosecution was reproved or cautioned, few convictions would stand.

13
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Defendant's objection to the court's statement at the
beginning of trial concerning accessory before the fact
and accessory after the fact is not substantiated. The
court's instruction to the jury at the close of trial properly explained the law and removed doubts which may
have existed in the jury's mind. Obviously, when the
court made the statement at the beginning of trial, it
'vas referring to a statement made by the prosecuting
attorney in his opening statement. The terms ''accessory
before the fact,'' and ''accessory after the fact'' are not
familiar to the layman, and may have created questions
in the jurors' minds. The court merely sought to make
a general explanation and mentioned that the law would
be given them later.
It is to be noted that the conduct of a trial is in the
hands of the trial judge, and his rulings should not be
overruled unless clearly an abuse of discretion or
prejudicial. The court sees the trial at first hand and is
aware of conditions which may not clearly be reflected
in the transcript of record.
At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury.
Instruction No. 26 is as follows :
''The court does not express to you any opinion
on any of the farts in the case, for it is immaterial
what the views of the court theron may be. Neither
by these instructions nor by any words uttered or
remarks made during tlu~ trial, does the court intimate or mean or "rish to be understood as giving
an opinion as to 'vhat the proof is or "~hat it is

14
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not, or what the facts are or what are not the facts
in this case.''
This instruction served to cure statements made by the
judge during the course of trial, which might appear on
their face to be prejudicial.
PoiNT

V.

IT WAS NOT ER.ROR FOR THE COURT TO ADMIT AS EVIDENCE C'ONVERSATIONS HELD BY
THE PROSECUTRIX AFTER. THE ATTACK, N'O,R
WAS SUCH EVIDENCE PREJUDICIAL.

We concur with appellants' general statement of the
law pertaining to the admission of testimony concerning
a complaint of rape. A statement of complaint made by a
woman sexually attacked is admitted as an exception to
the rule that the evidence of a witn~ss may not be corroborated by testimony of another witness who heard
the statement made. There are limitations to that rule.
One being that the details of the attack may not be related by the witness, another that the complaint should
have been made reasonably soon after the assault was
committed. Those elimitations do not apply here. The
first point to be observed from an analysis of the testimony which appellants attack is that contrary to appellants' allegation, the details of the assault were not related. The only testimony made by the prosecutrix in the
form of a complaint was that contained on pages 38 and
39 of the transcript. We quote portions hereof.
A. Karen asked me, she asked me if anything
happened, and I said, ''Yes,'' and she said, '' Oh,

15
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no; have you told your mother." I said, "No, but
I am going to.'' She said, ''Don't, come and talk
to me first.'' And I said ''all right.'' When the
telephone rang, mama, or about that time walked
out with my toreadors and asked me what happened, and I told her, well, let's go down to Karen's and I'll tell you, and so she was very-she
didn't want to at first and I said, "Well I won't
say anything until we talk to Karen,'' we went
down to Karen's place, mama driving. She drove
me down there. Karen came out.
*

*

*

*

A. I told her that I had been with these five
Spanish boys and that they had done something
to me and she asked me what, and I told her.
Q.

What did you tell

her~

A. I said they had sexual intercourse with
me and she got real upset and started to cry.''
The testimony of the "'"itness Karen Evans as to
the prosecutrix's complaint is likewise brief and without
details. See pages 123 and 124 of the transcript. We herewith quote portions of that testimony:
A. I asked her what time she got home and she
didn't tell me but pretty late, I said, ''did you
get home okay,'' and she said, ''no.'' I said, ''no,
what happened~" And she said, "I'll talk to you
I a ter. '' And I said, ''get your mother to bring
you over here now." She said, "what will I tell
her." I said, "tell her that you 'Yant to bring my
dress and shoes over and then 've will talk to her
about it,'' or talk it o\'"er. And her mother came
right over.

*

*

*

*
16
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Q.

Yes. "\Vhat did Ruth tell

you~

A. I just asked her what, we sat there about
5 or 10 minutes and neither of us said anything
and her mother said "what's the matter with you
two.'' And, I said, ''nothing,'' and Ruth said,
"nothing," and I said, "why don't you tell her so
we can do something.'' And she said, ''All right.''
Her mother kept saying, ''tell me Ruth, what happened.'' And she just kept saying, ''just a minute.'' And finally it came out and she told her
mother.
Q.

What did she tell her

mother~

A. Right at the time all she told us, is that
five Spanish boys were in the car and she said that
they raped her.
Certainly this testimony did not constitute a detailed
description of events. What this testimony amounted to
was simply that the prosecutrix was raped by five Spanish boys. There was no testimony as to names or where
the assault took place, or under what conditions.
There are three Utah decisions, two of which were
cited by appellants which we feel to be determinative
of this question. The first bears on the rule that a complaint should have been made within a reasonable time
after the offense. In Sta.te v. Neel (1900 Utah) 60 P. 510,
a conviction for rape, it appeared that the prosecutrix
did not complain to anyone about the offense until some
time after the day upon which it was committed. The
court held that it was error to admit the testimony concerning the complaint, but on the ground that it was too
delayed. The court, however, made the following state-
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ment as to lapse of time within which a complaint should
be made.
''While delay in making complaint may
awaken suspicion, and tend to discredit the testimony of the prosecuting witness, yet mere lapse
of time is not a test of admissibility, but simply
a matter which the jury may consider in determining the weight which ought to be given to it.''
In 1929, this court rendered a decision in State v.
Christensen, 276 P. 163, also a rape conviction. That
case is significant in that the evidence admitted there
appears to be more extensive and detailed than similar
testimony admitted in this case. The court's decision
quoted testimony of the mother of the prosecutrix as
follows:
The witness answered: ''She said that,
'Mama, I hope I haven't disgraced you; this man
has had something to do with me.' '' The district
attorney asked: "Did she state what the act was~"
The witness answered: ''Yes, sir.'' Here further
objections were made which were overruled. Then
further questions were asked and answered as
follows:
"Q. You may state what your daughter said
at that time~ A. She said that he had had sexual
intercourse with her.
''Q. Did your daughter make any statements
to you as to the conditions, under what conditions
the act of sexual intercourse took place' (Here
further objections were made which were overruled. ) A. Yes, sir.

"Q. What did she say? A. She told me he
had whiskey - She told me he had "'"hiskey, he
poured whiskey down her."
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The mother further testified that her daughter, when she came home, was intoxicated, and
that she ''smelled like a saloon.''
The court held that the admission of this evidence
was not error. The court said :
''It undoubtedly was competent to give testimony that the prosecutrix complained of an injury or outrage inflicted upon her and the nature
and character of it, 'vhere and when it occurred,
and that some one forcibly and against her will
and consent had sexual intercourse with her, had
ravished her. Generally, it is not competent to
give testimony as to the name of the person or who
it was that committed the outrage upon her; but,
under the circumstances, the statement the prosecutrix made, that the defendant' had had sexual intercourse v1ith her,' if not competent to be given,
was harmless, in view that the defendant by his
testimony admitted all of the facts and circumstances as related by the prosecutrix, except the
force and violence, that he was the person with
the prosecutrix, and had sexual intercourse with
her. There thus, on the record, was no issue or dispute as to the identity of the person who committed with or upon the prosecutrix, and no dispute as to the fact stated by the prosecutrix to her
mother that the defendant 'had sexual intercourse
with her.' "
Here, as in the Christensen case, there was no question of fact as to whether acts of sexual intercourse
took place; the issue was whether force and violence
were employed.
In a more recent Utah case, State v. Roberts (1937)
63 P. 2d 585, this court upheld the admission of cer-
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tain testimony given by a friend of the prosecutrix. The
decision followed and applied the Christensen case, supra.
Consideration of the evidence here reveals no
prejudice to defendants. They admitted sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, but denied using force or
threats. Her complaint as related by witnesses was not
a detailed description of events.
PoiNT

VI.

ERRORS COMMITTE·D BY THE COURT, IF ANY,
WERE NOT CUMULATIVE, AND WERE NOT
PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS.

The errors here, if any, were not cumulative, nor
were they prejudicial to defendants' rights. As early as
1909, this court said, in considering the question of
error:
''The admission of the immaterial evidence,
unless it in some way tends to prejudice the rights
of the party litigant against whom it is offered, is
no ground for reversing a. judgment. This rule
has so often been declared that '". e deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support of it.'' State
v. Justese1~ (Ut.) 99 P. 456.
In Sta.te v. Cox, ( 1929 U t.) 277 P. 972, this court was
considering on appeal an objection that the admission
of certain evidence was error because it related to independent offenses. The court said at page 973:
''We are inclined to think the eYidence was
erroneously a.dmi tted, but in vie"T of the satisfac20
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tory and convincing evidence of appellant's guilt
which stands wholly undisputed, the erroneous admission of the evidence does not call for a reversal
of the judgment. Without the objectional evidence, the verdict must have been the same.''
(Cases omitted.)
In the recent Neal case, this court again reaffirmed
the general rule :
''We will not reverse criminal causes for
mere error or irregularity. It is only when there
has been error which is both substantial and
prejudicial to the rights of the accused that a reversal is warranted." State v. Neal (1953 Utah)
262 P. 2d 756.
PoiNT

VII.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIE.NT TO CO·NVICT THE DEFE.NDANTS OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE.
The offense of rape is defined in Section 76-53-15,
UCA 1953, quoted in part as follows:
"Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female, not the wife of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances:

*

*

*

*

(3) Where she resists, but her resistance is
overcome by force or violence.
( 4) Where she is prevented from resisting by
threats of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution, or by
any intoxicating, narcotic or anaesthetic substance administered by or with the privity of the
accused.
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Appellants raise in issue the law of principals. Section 76-1-44, UCA 1953, is quoted in part as follows:
''All persons concerned in the commission of
a crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether
they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet in its commission or, not
being present, have advised and encouraged its
commission, * * * are principals in any crime
so committed. ' '
Appellants here were all principals. The abovequoted statute makes clear that one may be guilty of
rape without having had intercourse with the person upon
whom the offense was committed; see also State v. Brinkman (1926 Ut.) 251 P. 364, and State v. Carter (1947
Ariz.) 18 P. 2d 90. The significant terms of the statute
are "aid and abet." Those terms have been defined as
meaning to instigate, encourage, promote, or aid with
a guilty knowledge of the wrongful purpose of the
perpetrators. People v. Goldstine (Cal.) 303 P. 2d 892.
Also, it has been held that in order to "aid and abet"
another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the defendant in some way associate himself with the venture,
that he participate in it as in something that he wishes
to bring about, and that he seek, by his action, to make
it succeed. U. S. v. IJ!l oses (D. C. Pa.) 122 Fed. Supp. 523.
The following cases are significant in revealing to
what extent the courts have considered persons to be
principals in rape prosecutions. In People v. lJlarx (1919
Ill.) 125 N.E. 719, several defendants "~ere convicted
of the crime of rape. Two of the defendants, foster broth-
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ers, appealed on the ground that they had not partici pated in the offense, and they could not therefore be convicted. The sexual attack occurred in the back seat of
an automobile. The brothers were seated in the front seat
of the car, one of them being the driver of the vehicle.
There was no evidence that either brother participated in
the sexual act or threatened or directly applied any force
against the person raped. The car was driven about for
a period of time while the sexual attacks were taking
place. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction of the two brothers. We quote the following
extensive extract from that decision:
"It cannot be contended, of course, that mere
presence at the commission of a criminal act renders a person liable as a participator therein. If
he is only a spectator, innocent of any unlawful
intent, and does not act to countenance or approve
the acts of those who are actors, he is not criminally responsible because he happens to be a
looker-on and does not use active endeavors to
prevent the commission of the unlawful acts. 'Notwithstanding these rules as to the nonliability of
a passive spectator, it is certain that proof that
a person is present at the commission of a crime
without disapproving or opposing it is evidence
from which, in connection with other circumstances, it is competent for the jury to infer that
he assented thereto, lent to it his countenance and
approval, and was thereby aiding and abetting the
same.' 1 R.C.L. 141, and authorities there cited.
It is clear that the plaintiff in error Alex Marx,
who was driving the automobile, did not in any
way take part actively in the holding of the prosecutrix at the time when she charges the acts were
being forcibly committed, but the evidence shows
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without contradiction, and he himself admits, that
he drove the car several miles out of the way in
Chicago while going from the cabaret to the hotel
at Wabash avenue and Eighteenth street. His acts
in this regard tend to show that he was actually
encouraging and approving what was being done
in the car. We think, under the authorities and
the testimony in this regard, the jury were justified in finding that his foster brother, Peter Marx,
was assenting and by his actions approving, thereby aiding and abetting in the commission of the
offense, as he himself said that he suspected what
was going on in the rear of the car, and while he
denies the act the prosecutrix testified that he put
one of his hands upon her breast at some time
while they were in the car."
In a California case, People v. Macchiaroli (1921)
202 P. 474, appellant was one of three persons convicted
of robbing a man and woman and of raping the woman.
The third count against appellant charged him with
rape in that he aided and abetted one Gonzolez in the rape
of the woman. The fourth count charged him with rape
in that he aided and abetted Marsiglia in the rape of the
woman. The evidence disclosed that the three came upon
the man and woman in a car. They ordered them out and
robbed them both. Then while appellant held a gun on
the man, the other two, Gonzolez and Marsiglia carried
the woman across the road and raped her. Appellant
testified that he made some objection to the attack on the
woman. The man who was "'\\rith the ~Toman testified that
he heard the woman scream, but did not go to her aid
because of the gun being held against him. Appellant
appealed on the ground that there 'vas no evidence to
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sustain the conviction of the two rape charges. The California statute on principals is substantially the same as
the Utah statute. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that appellant did both aid and abet
the others in the commission of the crime of rape.
The evidence adduced at trial reveals that the sexual
assault was a common venture of all the appellants. There
was no evidence that any of them attempted to prevent
the commission of the acts. Appellants assert that as to
Matteo and Martinez, no force or threats were made.
But the threats and force were applied at the beginning
of the series of sexual assaults by the defendant Alveriz
and one Voss. The prosecutrix was, in fact, struck twice
( T. 27) with brass knuckles and bore bruises as a result
of those blows. She was warned that her face would be
"messed up." (T. 26, 27, and 29) Prior to the time that
either Matteo or Martinez assaulted her, Alevriz and
Voss had attempted to have intercourse with her. She
had been struck and threatened ; she had screamed ( T.
35); she attempted to run R\vay (T. 25); and shouted at
a passing car for help, but was caught and forced back
into the automobile. She requested on numerous occasions that she be taken home, and she pleade4 with defendants to leave her alone. The jury could reasonably believe she was too afraid or exhausted to further resist.
After the initial threats and force, the prosecutrix could
reasonably have assumed that any further resistance by
her would be met by more force or blows. She testified
that she attempted to raise herself several times, but
was forced down. Under the circumstances she likely
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believed that all the defendants were acting concertedly;
they gave no indication that their purposes were not the
same. It is often the situation in rape cases where a
woman is assaulted by a number of men that her resistance to the later attacks fails because of fear or
exhaustion.
It is alleged that the defendant Matteo did not have
intercourse with the prosecutrix, and that he did not
apply force or threats. He was, however, present in the
car at all times, and he made no effort to prevent the
assault. His private parts were exposed (T. 45) and
he was physically on the prosecutrix for a long period
of time, 45 minutes, according to his own testimony
(T. 185) and according to her testimony, trying to have
intercourse with her. (T 32) His conduct is certainly
not that of an innocent observer.
The prosecutrix's conduct in not reporting the
assault until the following morning is not unusual, and
under the circumstances, a jury could reasonably believe that she was too embarrassed, ashamed, or even
afraid of her parents, to have reported the incident. The
evidence is strong that this \Yas a scheme participated in
by all appellants. All during the night some one or
more persons were driving the car. Proserutrix was not
taken home as she repeatedly requested, but the car \Yas
parked, delayed, and driven in a round-about course, all
while the sexual assaults \vere taking place. She testified that while Alveriz was on her, at least two \Yere
holding her legs, and further, that some one \Yas al\Ya~Ts
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maneuvering her legs. The force used against her was
always by more than one person, as in forcing her down
on the back seat and in taking off her clothes. The witness, Karen Evans, testified that earlier in the evening
when she was with the group in Weber Canyon, that the
defendant Alveriz warned her to stay away from the
car, that ''those guys have one thing on their mind.''
( T. 117) He further implied that the group was planning
to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix.
It is submitted that there was sufficient evidence to
convict all three appellants. The testimony reveals concerted action, promotion and encouragement by the defendants. The jury could reasonably have found that all
defendants assented and lent their countenance to the
assault.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
GARY L. THEURER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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